The European Platform on Preparedness for Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response and Recovery (NERIS Platform) was established in June 15, 2010. The Mission of NERIS is to promote the involvement of different stakeholders and improve public confidence in capabilities of the key players in management of nuclear and radiological emergencies in Europe. The NERIS Platform encourages European, national, regional and local authorities, technical support organisations (TSOs), operators, professional organisations, research institutes, universities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and national and local stakeholders to co-operate in emergency management, and to facilitate access to expertise and technology in maintaining competence in the field of nuclear and radiological emergency management for the benefit of European countries and citizens. The vision is that by 2015, the self-sustaining NERIS association exists, and by 2020, all European organisations being members of the association are sharing common views and common approaches and are developing and using compatible technology and methods for consequence management of the emergencies. The NERIS Platform has, in September 2012, 43 member organisations representing stakeholders with a wide range of backgrounds, e.g. authorities, emergency centres, research organisations and the academic community. The Strategic Research Agenda (SRA), being under preparation, will provide the basis for priorities of future research and development in order to achieve the vision. The SRA therefore will communicate the future research needs, but will also be an instrument for creating synergies, co-operation and coordination internally between the NERIS participants and externally with activities taking place within other international forums.

The European Basic Safety Standards Directive (EU, 1996) contains a chapter on intervention, which, to a large extent, is dedicated to emergency planning and response, but without detailed requirements. A new Directive will consolidate all existing Directives and thus broaden the scope to all exposure situations and categories of exposure, including the protection of the environment. This new text follows the situation-based approach recommended by ICRP (ICRP, 2007). The requirements for emergency preparedness have been worked out in more detail, and the use of reference levels for emergency response is highlighted. The accident in Fukushima prompted reflection on the Euratom legal framework, including the Basic Safety Standards, the arrangements for the early exchange of information (ECURIE) and legislation on the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. A “stress test” of EU nuclear power plants has been undertaken, which includes on-site emergency response. The results of this exercise will allow the Commission to report, by the end of 2012, to the EP and the Council, and to propose new legislation as appropriate. This may extend to the harmonisation of off-site emergency response and communication arrangements among Member States. Meanwhile, an informal coordination mechanism is being set up with the Heads of European Radiation Protection Competent Authorities (HERCA). With regard to the legislation on maximum permitted levels in food, there will be further reflection on the consistency between the controls in place after Chernobyl and after Fukushima, as well as their consistency with the values for the placing on the market of food and feed in the EU in the event of a future accident.

An interim edition of the IAEA Safety Requirements document: “Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards” (BSS) was published in November 2011. The revision of the BSS was coordinated by a BSS Secretariat consisting of representatives of the IAEA, FAO, EC, ILO, UNEP, PAHO, WHO and NEA/OECD. The BSS takes into account the Fundamental Safety Principles, the findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and the 2007 recommendations of the International Commission of Radiological Protection (ICRP) and other applicable ICRP statements and publications. This paper provides an overview of the revised BSS, including requirements on preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency and to remediation of areas contaminated by residual radioactive material following a nuclear or radiological emergency.

Expert Group on Implementation of New International Recommendations for Emergency Exposure Situations (EGIRES) of the Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matter (WPNEM) has been mandated by the Committee of Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency to investigate issues in, and approaches to, the implementation of the new ICRP recommendations and revised Basic Safety Standards of the IAEA for emergency exposure situations, specifically nuclear/radiological emergencies including accidents and consequence management for malicious acts. This also includes the application of optimisation of protection strategies, setting of reference levels and the inclusion of stakeholder input in this process. The expected output of the expert group is to prepare a report on issues covering mentioned topics. Emergency exposure situations, as defined by the ICRP, are unexpected situations that may require urgent protective actions, and perhaps longer-term protective actions to be implemented. The Commission continues to recommend optimisation and the use of reference levels to ensure an adequate degree of protection with respect to exposure to ionising radiation in emergency exposure situations. Setting reference levels is a responsibility of national authorities and reference levels represent the level of dose or risk, above which it is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur and for which therefore protective actions should be planned and optimized. EGIRES decided to analyze the established processes for optimization of the protection strategy for emergency exposure situations and practical implementation of reference levels concept in several member states of the NEA by performing a survey. It is planned to collect information on the definition of optimization strategy in different countries, optimization of protection for different protective actions and also optimization of urgent protective actions. In addition, national criteria in setting reference levels, its use, relevant processes including specific triggers and dosimetric quantities in setting reference levels are focus points that will be evaluated. Benefits expected from the work of the expert group will be useful to find a path and even common understanding of surrounding issues in emergency exposure situations with the inclusion of national perspectives and also to discuss stakeholder involvement.

Over the last few decades, the steady progress achieved in reducing planned exposures of both workers and the public has been admirable in the nuclear sector. However, the disproportionate focus on tiny public exposures and radioactive discharges associated with normal operations came at a high price, and the quasi-denial of a risk of major accident and related weaknesses in emergency preparedness and response came at even higher price. Fukushima has unfortunately taught us that radiological protection (RP) for emergency and post-emergency can be much more than a simple evacuation that lasts 24 to 48 hours with people safely returning to their homes shortly afterward. On optimization of emergency and post-emergency exposures, the only “show in town” in terms of international RP policies improvements has been the issuance of the ICRP’s new general recommendations. However, no matter how genuine these improvements were, they have not been “road tested” to the practical reality of severe accidents. Post-Fukushima, there is a compelling case to review the practical adequacy of key RP notions such as optimization, evacuation, sheltering, reference levels for workers and the public, and to amend these notions with a view to make the international RP system more useful in the event of a severe accident. In pursuing further improvements to the international RP system, it should be clearly borne in mind that the system is generally based on protection against the risk of cancer and hereditary diseases. The system also protects against deterministic non-cancer effects on tissues and organs. In seeking refinements of such protection notions, we invite ICRP to pay increased attention to the fact that a continued balance must be struck between beneficial activities which cause exposures, and protection. The global nuclear industry is committed to help overcoming the above key RP issues as part of the RP community’s upcoming international deliberations towards a more efficient international RP system.

With the ICRP recommendations Publications 103, 109 and 111 (ICRP, 2007; ICRP 2009a, 2009b), new concepts and quantities have been introduced into emergency management and rehabilitation. Two of them will possibly influence national procedures, but for sure they will influence countermeasure simulation approaches: 1. The concept of a “reference level” for emergency and existing controllable exposure situations that represents the level of dose or risk, above which it is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur, and for which therefore protective actions should be planned in advance. 2. When deciding on the optimum course of protective actions, all exposure pathways and all relevant actions have to be taken into account. The major changes for the simulation models result from the second recommendation that all exposure pathways must be considered when deciding on protective actions. So far all countermeasure simulations in the early phase of an emergency are carried out by considering individual countermeasures such as sheltering or evacuation, if some dose limit for the respective action is exceeded. This approach has to be changed and strategies of several countermeasures analysed and simulated with the ultimate goal not to exceed the reference level over a given time period, typically one year.

In April 2011 the European Platform on Preparedness for Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response and Recovery (NERIS-TP) decided to expand the two European Decision Support Systems JRodos and ARGOS with respect to the new ICRP-103 recommendations. The extension should be applicable for nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies and comprise a new screening model, the possibility to optimise dose reducing actions with the models ERMIN (European Model for Inhabited Areas) and AGRICP (Agricultural Countermeasure Program), respectively, and scenario preparation tools to support the user in defining countermeasure strategies. This paper describes the screening model that was developed by the authors and is foreseen for realisation and inclusion in JRodos and ARGOS in 2012/2013.

As part of the ongoing European project NERIS-TP, a revision has been made of some parameters influencing dose estimates in the European emergency management decision support systems RODOS and ARGOS. On the basis of survey data, the estimates of the time fractions typically spent indoors and outdoors over longer time periods have been revised. On the basis of measurement data, also new values for the natural ventilation rate governing early ingression of contaminants into dwellings have been derived for different parts of Europe. Other potential parameterisation improvements for the decision support systems are discussed.

The improved use of collective dose following the 2007 ICRP recommendations is studied for nuclear and radiological emergency situations. To study the accumulation of low individual doses to the collective dose the collective dose is calculated as a function of the minimum individual dose for three cases including nuclear as well as radiological accidents. It is found that the use of collective dose in this way can have an added value in nuclear emergency preparedness and response in particular related to decisions on overall protective actions following an accident.

The Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) of the International Atomic Emergency Agency (IAEA) is the global focal point for preparedness and response to nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies irrespective of their cause. In the area of preparedness the Centre continuously works to develop standards and guidance for strengthening Member States’ preparedness; practical tools and training programs to assist Member States in promptly applying the standards and guidance; and organizes a variety of training events and exercises. This paper provides an overview of the information presented in the IAEA Safety Standards and Guidance in the area of emergency preparedness and response.

In Germany, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) has asked the German Commission on Radiological Protection (SSK) to provide advice on the revision of the German “Radiological Fundamentals for Decisions on Measures for the Protection of the Population against Accidental Releases of Radionuclides” (Radiologische Grundlagen). A working group has been established to guide the preparation of a new version of that document. It was asked that the revision has to consider most relevant publications of international bodies such as ICRP, EC and IAEA. Therefore, the ICRP recommendations 103, 109 and 111 have to be considered together with the draft documents of the European Union and the IAEA Basic Safety Standards. Recommendations of working groups of NEA (WPNEM) as well as the EPAL working group of HERCA (Heads of European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities) will be also taken into account. Within the discussion it turned out that the practical application of the new recommendation for professionals working in the operational community is extremely important. As the current recommendations are widely accepted and operational all over Germany, it was investigated to which extent the current procedures can be taken over with minor modifications.

In Finland, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is the competent authority and the national warning point with respect to bilateral and international agreements. STUK has drafted proposals for new guides for intervention levels in different phases of an emergency to be adopted by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Finland. These guides are written separately for early phase and intermediate phase of a radiological emergency. STUK selected 20 mSv effective residual dose from all exposure pathways during the first year of an emergency as the reference level. This overall goal has been supplemented with the following general guidance; if a projected dose without protective measures is during the first year: (1) higher than 10 mSv, it is necessary to perform protective measures; radiation expose is dominant in decision making, (2) 1–10 mSv, protective measures are usually justified but other factors effect decision making, (3) below 1 mSv, the protective measures may be carried out especially if they are easily feasible; other factors are dominant in decision making. More specific criteria are given for separate countermeasures as a projected dose in a certain time period or as an operational intervention level (OIL) in a quantity which can be directly measured (external dose rate, magnitude of surface contamination, concentration level) or as a trigger (such as plant conditions). This paper presents the main intervention levels and criteria to be used in a radiological emergency for members of the public.

HPA is updating and consolidating its advice on radiation emergencies and recovery. Current advice was published in 1997. Since 2007, the ICRP has issued a set of recommendations to elaborate its guidance for emergency exposure and existing exposure situations. It is expected that the European Basic Safety Standards, when published, will also reflect the ICRP recommendations. The new ICRP guidance represents a marked change in approach, with emphasis placed on optimisation of whole protection strategies using reference levels of residual dose. These new concepts as well as the relevant lessons identified following the Fukushima accident will be included in the new UK advice document. The scope of the UK advice includes reactor and transport accidents as well as releases from waste stores, reprocessing and defence activities. The revised advice will consider the initiation of emergency countermeasures based on averted dose criteria and optimisation of the subsequent protection strategy based on reference levels of residual dose. The advice will illustrate that the type of protection strategy selected depends on the contribution of different exposure pathways over time to projected dose, and this will vary according to the scenarios considered as reasonably foreseeable. Due to the potential impact of the advice, a wide range of stakeholders are being consulted. In particular, feedback will be required on the potential for adapting current practices for sheltering and stable iodine prophylaxis to situations involving longer duration releases or those with a prolonged threat phase. The advice document will contain guidance for emergency planning and response, criteria for the withdrawal of emergency countermeasures, factors to consider during the transition to an existing exposure situation and the management of long term contaminated areas. It is the first time that the whole spectrum of advice will be presented in a single publication, which is expected to be published in 2013, following a public consultation process.

The nuclear reactor remote monitoring system of the federal state of Baden- Wuerttemberg (KFUe BW) is realized according to the renewed “recommendations for remote monitoring of nuclear power plants” (BMU, 2005a). The spectrum of the system covers both, pursuit of operational procedures, and incidents or accidents. The KFUe BW provides a measurement network and information system for operational parameters at the plant sites as well as radiological and meteorological measurements in their vicinity. For the Ministry, it preferentially serves as an instrument of nuclear supervision. This paper gives a brief survey of the system architecture and concentrates on the role of the KFUe with respect to the determination and evaluation of the radiological situation in the range of off-site emergency management.

During nuclear or radiological emergency preparedness and response a processing pipeline is put in place at the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority to produce assessment reports of the current situation, its likely evolution with time, and recommendations on protective actions. Within the processing pipeline raw data is more and more refined towards these end products as experts, advisors, and decision makers collect, analyze, portray, annotate, filter, arrange and rearrange, share, approve or dismiss, and publish content. Emergency procedures and guidelines assist and guide them through the process, as do information and communication technologies. The inner working of the processing pipeline is in constant flux as information and communication technologies develop and allow better facilitation of the process, and as social and political demands change. The present article describes the overall working of the pipeline, and how it has recently been improved by the KETALE collaborative software. The focus then shifts to the new ICRP recommendations and how the new national emergency guidelines are planned to be implemented within the KETALE software. The KETALE software has greatly increased the throughput of our emergency processing pipeline and improved product quality.

The new recommendations on emergency exposure situations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) advise a reference level for the residual dose in a range of between 20 and 100 mSv effective dose (acute or per year). At the same time, the protection strategy should account for the simultaneous consideration of all the exposure pathways, as well as all of the protective actions. Similarly to other countries, the actual Belgian nuclear emergency plan is based on individual projected doses (thyroid committed dose and total effective doses) and independent protective actions that mainly focus on the early phase of an emergency situation. The two approaches are compared in this study on the basis of the projected and residual dose calculations obtained using JRODOS and the Belgian Noodplan models for different radiological or nuclear accidental scenarios. The comparison has been made by considering separately the early and the late phase contributions. The ingestion dose has been investigated from the predicted deposition values and compared to the single level of the ICRP 109 recommendations.

The unusually strong earthquake in Japan on 11 March 2011 and the following extreme tsunami caused enormous damage in the buildings of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) situated on the Pacific coastline of Japan. The accident led to the release of a large amount of radioactive material into the environment. According to the measurements of the Radiological Monitoring and Data Acquisitions Network (RAMDAN) the radioactive plume reached Hungary on 24 March 2011. The main volatile fission products – 131I, 134Cs, and 137Cs radioisotopes – were measurable in aerosol and fallout samples in Hungary. Their activity concentration in air reached the maximum value in the last days of March and returned to the background level in the first half of May. As a consequence of respiration of contaminated air, a maximum of 1 Bq per capita of 131I could be accumulated in the thyroid gland of the Hungarian population during the given period. The calculated upper limits of the committed effective dose from inhalation of 131I were 4 nSv and 10 nSv to the Hungarian adults and infants, respectively. These values are a hundred thousand times less than the annual radiation dose from natural sources to the Hungarian population. The radiation dose from radioactive caesium isotopes originating from Fukushima was even less, around 1 nSv on average, to Hungarian residents. No health deterioration can be expected from this radiation burden.